2014 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Game Theoretic Analyses of the Stablitiy of Patent Pools and Their Formation Process
| Project/Area Number |
24730163
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Chiba University (2014)
Tokyo Institute of Technology (2012-2013) |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Keywords | 特許権 / ライセンス契約 / ゲーム理論 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We analyze patent licensing agreements signed by a patent holder and oligopolistic firms in practical situations, and examine the stability of patent pools that are formed by multiple patent holders. The main results of this research show the number of licensees and the licensing policies that most benefit a patent holder in various patent licensing problems. Furthermore, by focusing on licensing revenue allocation in patent pools, we propose the condition under which different types of patent holders form stable patent pools.
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| Free Research Field |
社会科学
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