Design of efficient and fair cost allocation rules in minimum cost spannning tree problems

2014 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 24730174
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Fukuoka University
• Principal Investigator: KONGO Takumi 福岡大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (70579664)
• Project Period (FY): 2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
• Keywords: 提携型ゲーム / 公平性 / 効率性 / 公理的特徴付け / オークション

Outline of Final Research Achievements

This project studies how to distribute the surplus generated by cooperation among multiple agents. A typical example of such kind of problems is that distribution of cost of forming/maintaining networks among multiple users like minimum cost spanning tree problems. Following an axiomatic approach, especially focusing on efficiency, which requires that the surplus is fully allocated among agents, and fairness, which requires that no agent is dissatisfied with allocations, an auction rule and a solution for transferable utility coalitional games are axiomatically characterized.

Free Research Field

ゲーム理論