The Optimal Punishment for Patent Infringement

2014 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 24730212
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Applied economics
• Research Institution: Kochi University (2013-2014); Aomori Public College (2012)
• Principal Investigator: ARAI Yasuhiro 高知大学, 教育研究部人文社会科学系, 講師 (20611213)
• Project Period (FY): 2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
• Keywords: 特許権 / 知的財産権 / 法と経済学

Outline of Final Research Achievements

Using a theoretical model, this study compares the implications of civil and criminal penalty schemes from the viewpoint of social welfare, where civil and criminal schemes are distinguished by whether penalties are paid to the patent holder or the government.
We find that depending on the development cost of the goods, the government should set the expected penalties either to zero or to a level that makes the producer’s profit zero. We also show that civil punishment for patent infringement is socially desirable in general setting.
However, we also find that imposing small criminal punishments may be socially desirable when the penalties paid by illegal user depend on lost profits of the patent holder.

Free Research Field

産業組織論