2013 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Goods Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions
| Project/Area Number |
24830004
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
|
| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
|---|
| Research Field |
Economic theory
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Otaru University of Commerce |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2012-08-31 – 2014-03-31
|
| Keywords | 組合わせオークション / 収益単調性 / 需要の価格弾力性 / 独占 |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
We study a new monotonicity problem in combinatorial auctions called goods revenue monotonicity, which requires that the auctioneer earn no more revenue by dropping goods from the endowments.
Although no mechanism satisfies goods revenue monotonicity together with other desirable properties, we find a restricted domain in which there exists a goods revenue monotone mechanism satisfying the above three conditions. The restriction is likely to be met when the number of active bidders is sufficiently large.
This suggests that it is important that governments eliminate all barriers to entry and invite bids when they auction their public goods.
|
