2013 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Studies on Public Economics: Approaches from the Theory of Mechanism Design
| Project/Area Number |
24830109
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kansai University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-08-31 – 2014-03-31
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / ミクロ経済学 / 公共経済学 |
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| Research Abstract |
We study a problem of mechanism design theory. We study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategy-proofness and no-vetoer. We also construct a large coordination game model of second-language acquisition.
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Research Products
(4 results)
