2017 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Preventive Investment and Relief Spending for Natural Disasters
| Project/Area Number |
25245043
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Public economy
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| Research Institution | Nihon University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
瀬下 博之 専修大学, 商学部, 教授 (20265937)
日引 聡 東北大学, 経済学研究科, 教授 (30218739)
青木 研 上智大学, 経済学部, 教授 (70275014)
浅田 義久 日本大学, 経済学部, 教授 (70299874)
中川 雅之 日本大学, 経済学部, 教授 (70324853)
有村 俊秀 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 教授 (70327865)
宅間 文夫 明海大学, 不動産学部, 准教授 (80337493)
川西 諭 上智大学, 経済学部, 教授 (90317503)
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| Research Collaborator |
HARANO Kei 日本住宅総合センター
SADAYUKI Taisuke 早稲田大学
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| Project Period (FY) |
2013-10-21 – 2018-03-31
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| Keywords | 時間整合性 / モラルハザード / 強制保険 / 事後的救済 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We consider the locational decisions of residents in a small, open linear city at risk for natural disasters and analyzes the relationship between public investment in disaster prevention and compensation by the government. Remarkably, the ex post optimal compensation policy, a type of fully covered compensation, causes time-inconsistency problems. That is, such ex post policy makes the residential area more vulnerable to natural disasters in ex ante. As a result, the ex post compensation policy requires excess preventive investment, unless it is financed from outside the community. External financing does not improve this problem rather may exacerbate these problems. Basing on this theoretical findings, we argue socially optimal disaster policy to resolve these problems.
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| Free Research Field |
法と経済学
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