2015 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Spatial Voting Theory under the Existence of Fundamental Parties
| Project/Area Number |
25380147
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Politics
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| Research Institution | University of Tsukuba |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
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| Keywords | 空間的投票理論 / ゲーム理論 / ε均衡 / 部分ゲーム完全均衡解 / 原理党 / 現実党 / 国政選挙 / 有権者意見分布 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In the Downsian spatial voting theory, the parties are assumed to determine their policies so that their numbers of votes obtained should be maximized (realistic parties). In the actual elections in Japan, there are parties which determine their policies based only on principled grounds (fundamental parties).
Existence of fundamental parties affects the election returns. It means that the traditional Downsian model might be unrealistic in Japan. In the present study, we formulate an election as a game for extensive form, and investigate the possible existence of subgame perfect equilibriums (including epsilon equilibriums) under various conditions. Empirical works are also carried out to check whether the results partially explain the national elections in Japan. From quantitative point of view, empirical results are sometimes not explained by the theoretical prediction. Possible effects of regional ununiformity are also investigated.
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| Free Research Field |
Mathematical Engineering
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