Possibility and Limitation of Mechanism Design in Economic Environments

2017 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 25380218
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Tohoku University
• Principal Investigator: OHSETO SHINJI 東北大学, 経済学研究科, 教授 (00278475)
• Project Period (FY): 2013-04-01 – 2018-03-31
• Keywords: メカニズム・デザイン / 相互評価 / 次点付き多数決 / 非分割財配分 / 耐戦略性

Outline of Final Research Achievements

Mechanism design is a research field that designs mechanisms (institutions) for achieving social and economic goals, taking into account the strategic behavior of individuals that make up society. In this research, firstly, we addressed a new problem of designing an award system based on mutual evaluation and proposed an interesting mechanism called "plurality with runners-up". Second, we analyzed the allocation mechanism of indivisible goods and proved that there is no mechanism satisfying strategy-proofness, symmetry and budget balance.

Free Research Field

メカニズム・デザイン