Experiments on Negotiation Processes in Weighted Voting Mechanisms

2015 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 25380222
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: University of Tsukuba
• Principal Investigator: Watanabe Naoki 筑波大学, システム情報系, 准教授 (20378954)
• Project Period (FY): 2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
• Keywords: 重み付き投票 / 被験者実験 / 投票力指数の再構築

Outline of Final Research Achievements

In European commission, for instance, each member nation is apportined her votes in accordance with her population. This type of social decision-making system is called weighted voting. Disparity of one vote is discussed also in Japan. Under such an vote apportionment in accordance with members' populations, however, it has been reported that a nation had no influence on the decision. In weighted voting, the number of votes apportioned in the committee is not necessarily a source of voting power, and thus it would be possible to design a better social decision-making system if we could predict the voting outcomes. In this research, we conducted voting experiments and found some regularity on the voting outcomes. To predict voting outcomes in real practices precisely, further investigation is needed for future research.

Free Research Field

経済理論