Advances in the Theory of Incentives

2016 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 25380224
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: The University of Tokyo
• Principal Investigator: KANDORI Michihiro 東京大学, 大学院経済学研究科(経済学部), 教授 (10242132)
• Research Collaborator: OBARA Ichiro 米国UCLA, 経済学部, 教授 ; YOKOO Makoto 九州大学, システム情報科学府, 教授 ; IWASAKI Atsushi 電気通信大学, 情報システム学研究科, 准教授 ; KAMADA Yuichiro 米国UC Berkely・Haas, ビジネススクール, 助教授 ; OBAYASHI Shinya 東京大学, 大学院経済学研究科, 日本学術振興会特別研究員(PD)
• Project Period (FY): 2013-04-01 – 2017-03-31
• Keywords: ゲーム理論 / くり返しゲーム / 私的不完全観測 / 協調 / ケーススタディ / 労働組合

Outline of Final Research Achievements

This project provided an answer to a long-standing open problem of finding a general method to identify equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring. This was done by an application of Partially Observable Markov Decision Problem, and simple and robust ways to sustain cooperation under misperception were identified. The project also proposed a new class of game theoretic models, revision games, to show that cooperation is sustained in one-shot relationship, through the process of revising strategies. Furthermore, detailed empirical study was conducted about a labor union of an unusual form, a striking real-life example of OLG repeated game with private monitoring. Based on hearings and data analysis, it was discovered that there is a clever way to sustain cooperation, even though labor union members have very limited information about who helped whom.

Free Research Field

理論経済学