How can we overcome the coordination/cooperation dilemma under stranger condition?

2015 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 25380241
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Waseda University
• Principal Investigator: Shimizu Kazumi 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 教授 (20308133)
• Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha): Kamijo Yoshio 高知工科大学, マネジメント学部, 准教授 (40453972)
• Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha): Ozono Haruki 鹿児島大学, 法文学部, 准教授 (50709467)
• Project Period (FY): 2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
• Keywords: 経済学実験 / スタッグハントゲーム / 公共財供給ゲーム / 懲罰 / ゲーム理論

Outline of Final Research Achievements

We examine three tools that can enhance coordination success in a repeated multiple-choice coordination game. Gradualism means that the game starts as an easy coordination problem and moves gradually to a more difficult one. The Endogenous Ascending mechanism implies that a gradual increase in the upper bound of coordination occurs only if coordination with the Pareto superior equilibrium in a stage game is attained. The Endogenous Descending mechanism requires that when the game’s participants fail to coordinate, the level of the next coordination game be adjusted such that the game becomes simpler. Our laboratory experiment proves that a mechanism that combines these three tools, herein termed the “Gradualism-Endogenous Ascending-Endogenous Descending (GEAD)” mechanism, works well.

Free Research Field

実験経済学、行動経済学、制度の経済学