2016 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Mechanism Design in the Kidney Exchange Problem
| Project/Area Number |
25380244
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Ryukoku University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Keywords | 経済理論 / ゲーム理論 / メカニズム・デザイン / マーケット・デザイン / マッチング / 社会的選択理論 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This project formulates and studies the requirement on a kidney exchange mechanism that no pair of patients should be able to benefit by exchanging their donors with each other using either fake marriage or fake adoption prior to the operation of the chosen mechanism. We call this requirement “pre-exchange-proofness.” We show that the top trading cycles mechanism is the only mechanism satisfying individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and pre-exchange-proofness. Moreover, it turns out that a stronger version of pre-exchange-proofness is incompatible with individual rationality whenever there are three or more patients.
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| Free Research Field |
メカニズム・デザイン
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