A Research on the Relationship between Strategic Interaction among Hospitals that Entry into DPC Market and the Medical Care Cost

2016 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 25380369
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Public finance/Public economy
• Research Institution: Sophia University
• Principal Investigator: AOKI Ken 上智大学, 経済学部, 教授 (70275014)
• Project Period (FY): 2013-04-01 – 2017-03-31
• Keywords: 診断群分類別包括支払い方式 / 病院の参入 / 戦略的相互依存 / 病院間の競争

Outline of Final Research Achievements

A new hospital financing system named diagnosis procedure combination/per-diem payment system (DPC/PDPS or DPC) has been introduced in Japan in 2003. DPC has given different incentives for hospitals from the former fee-for-service (FFS) reimbursement and it has been expected that DPC saves Japanese medical care cost because DPC is a kind of prospective payment system. However, even after the financing reform, each hospital can choose which payment system, DPC or FFS, is applied to him/her by him/herself. If each hospital selects a payment that is more profitable for him/her, the introduction of the new payment system cannot lead to medical care cost containment.
In this research, we examine the effect of strategic interaction among hospitals that entry into DPC market on their profits. We estimate how profit of a hospital changes depending on its own and rival's entry behavior into the DPC market since medical care cost is highly correlated with hospitals' profit.

Free Research Field

医療経済学