2016 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
The scope of earnings management and the incentives for fraudulent accounting
| Project/Area Number |
25380612
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Accounting
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| Research Institution | Reitaku University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2013-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Keywords | 粉飾決算 / 誘因 / 利益調整 / ゲーム理論 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We come across views that options in accounting methods should be decreased from the perspective of reliability and comparability. If reducing the range of such an earnings management leads to fraud accounting, it is a problem that cannot be ignored. The research question is concerned with verifying this. I could gain some result as following. First, the differences in type’s value and the size of costs among corporates can become the natures of decision making in fraudulent accounting. Next, as the probability of improving economic conditions increase, it is easier for fraudulent accounting to occur. Furthermore, if the range of earnings management is suciently large, fraudulent accounting does not occur and if earnings management is not recognized, fraudulent accounting will occur. From this, with respect to the view that reliability should be ensured by narrowing the range of earnings management, it would seem that the likelihood of fraudulent accounting conversely increases.
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| Free Research Field |
財務会計
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