Mechanism design of dynamic resource allocations

2016 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 25780132
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Kyoto University
• Principal Investigator: Sano Ryuji 京都大学, 経済研究所, 助教 (50611208)
• Research Collaborator: MURAMOTO Akitoshi 駒澤大学, 経済学部, 非常勤講師
• Project Period (FY): 2013-04-01 – 2017-03-31
• Keywords: ゲーム理論 / オークション / メカニズムデザイン

Outline of Final Research Achievements

I study environments in which objects are repeatedly allocated by auctions. First, I study dynamic mechanism design problem in which objects are allocated in each period and agents have perfect complementarity for intertemporal objects. I characterize the incentive compatibility in the environment with multi-dimensional type and derive both efficient and revenue-maximizing mechanisms. Second, I also study sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects. I provide the conditions for the existence of a symmetric increasing equilibrium and for declining prices in the equilibrium.

Free Research Field

理論経済学