Comparative institutional analysis of liability for complex accidental disasters: Institutional design with experimental law and economics

2015 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 25780188
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Public finance/Public economy
• Research Institution: Hiroshima University
• Principal Investigator: Goto Daisaku 広島大学, 国際協力研究科, 准教授 (80432847)
• Project Period (FY): 2013-04-01 – 2016-03-31
• Keywords: 経済実験 / 災害リスク / 認識バイアス / 責任負担ルール

Outline of Final Research Achievements

Complex accidental disasters (CADs) arise from natural disaters directly, but they cause the expanded losses by human factors indirectly. In order to provide a new scientific basis of design of liability allocation rules which cope with the mutual risk recognition biases against the CADs, this study applied field and laboratory economic experiments to identify individual risk/loss preferences and preventive behaviors with socio-economic backgrounds in several liability rules' contexts. This study shows: (1) In rural coastal areas of Bangladesh where households face risks of CADs arise from cyclones without any explicit liablity rule settings, micro-credits and domestic remittances have important roles for the damaged households to recover from the disaster. (2) Among the households suffered from a cyclone, households succeeded in income recovery are risk-loving, but households failed in income recovery are loss averse.

Free Research Field

環境経済学，法と経済学，開発ミクロ経済学