Political Economy of Intergovernmental Relationship

2016 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 26285065
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
• Allocation Type: Partial Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Public finance/Public economy
• Research Institution: Keio University
• Principal Investigator: DOI TAKERO 慶應義塾大学, 経済学部, 教授 (60302783)
• Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha): 寺井 公子 慶應義塾大学, 経済学部, 教授 (80350213) ; 別所 俊一郎 慶應義塾大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (90436741)
• Project Period (FY): 2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
• Keywords: 地方財政 / 共有資源問題 / 政府間財政関係 / 地方分権 / 外形標準課税 / 予防接種

Outline of Final Research Achievements

This study focuses on intergovernmental relationship as problems of "Tragedy of the Commons." We obtain the main following results through both theoretical and empirical analyses. In a theoretical one, herd behavior of local governments are observed when they are risk-averse, and it lowers economic growth, which expects to be enhanced by an innovative policy. In an empirical study, such herd behavior is observed using regional variations in vaccination subsidy amount within Japan's current immunization program. Also, the same tax base of national and local taxes can be recognized as a commons. We examine a simulation analysis of corporate tax reform using a dynamic general equilibrium model, since national corporate tax and corporate income tax are the same tax base, and obtain results that labor income totally increases after the reform, but partly decreases by an increase in size-based business taxation of local tax.

Free Research Field

財政学