2016 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Stohcastically stable equilibria in the hybrid play
| Project/Area Number |
26380245
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Nihon University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Keywords | ナッシュ均衡 / 確率進化 / ゼロ和ゲーム / 支配可解 / 進化安定均衡 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The hybrid play has been proposed as a new approach in the stochastic evolutionary game theory, which investigates the stability and the selection of equilibria in games. As a preliminary study, this research focused its attention to the stability of equilibria with respect to the iterated eliminations of dominated strategies. An investigation of the interchangeability condition led to a new concept of a game, the pairwise solvable game. The class of pairwise solvable games is rich enough to include various games that frequently appear in applications, such as the electoral competition games, the rent-seeking games, and the tournament games. It is shown that the set of equilibria in a pairwise solvable game is interchangeable. Under a quasiconcavity condition, a generic pairwise solvable game with a linearly ordered strategies has a symmetric equilibrium. More important, if a quasiconcave pairwise solvable game is finite, it is dominance solvable.
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| Free Research Field |
ゲーム理論
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