Trade policies implemented by segmented departments seeking self-interest

2016 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 26380340
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Economic policy
• Research Institution: Ritsumeikan University
• Principal Investigator: Ohkawa Takao 立命館大学, 経済学部, 教授 (10258494)
• Project Period (FY): 2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
• Keywords: 見かけ上の目的 / 真の目的 / 縦割り行政 / 省益追求 / 公益追求 / 関税 / 補助金 / 寡占

Outline of Final Research Achievements

We consider a government consisting of two policy implementation departments,
each of which is self-interested. We examine whether each of these departments
disguises itself as a benevolent policymaker in the sense that it adopts welfare maximization as its “surface” objective to determine the policy variable, although its“true” objective is self-interest maximization under a tariff/subsidy scheme. We also examine whether an increase in the number of departments disguising themselves as welfare-maximizers improves welfare. When the cost difference between home and foreign firms is at the intermediate level, the subsidy department does not disguise itself as a benevolent policymaker, whereas the tariff department may do so. In addition, the welfare level in the partial disguise case is lower than that in the no disguise case.

Free Research Field

応用ミクロ経済学