2016 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
An Evolutionary Game Approach to the Legal Choice between Property Rules and Liability Rules
| Project/Area Number |
26590046
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Public economy
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| Research Institution | Osaka University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Keywords | 法と経済学 / 進化ゲーム理論 / 所有権ルール / 損害賠償ルール / 法と経済発展 / 法と社会規範 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This research studied the fundamental problem in law and economics about the rational choice between property rules versus liability rules in the legal situation of tort. It applied the theoretical framework of evolutionary game theory and showed that evolutionary stable choice between liability rules and property rules depends on the relative magnitude of productivity of the defendant and plaintiff with respect to the potentially common property.
Related with this topic, it also studied the efficient choice between legislated law and social norm, and the relationship between the state and civil society.
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| Free Research Field |
法と経済学、公共経済学、厚生経済学
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