A Theory of Algorithm Design with Incentives

2015 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 26730005
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Theory of informatics
• Research Institution: Kyushu University
• Principal Investigator: Todo Taiki 九州大学, システム情報科学研究科(研究院, 助教 (50708394)
• Project Period (FY): 2014-04-01 – 2016-03-31
• Keywords: ゲーム理論 / アルゴリズム設計 / マルチエージェントシステム / ミクロ経済学

Outline of Final Research Achievements

During this research project, we investigated the effect of dummy input in various algorithms. For individual allocation problems, we consider both barter exchange and cake cutting. We also define a weaker notion of resistance, based on computational complexity, against dummy input and showed that a simple extension of the top-trading-cycles algorithm satisfies it. For social decision problems, we dealt with location of two identical facilities on a line. We successfully characterized the behavior of algorithms that is resistant to dummy input. Furthermore, we provided several complexity results for a variant of picking sequence problem, in which the sequence is randomly determined.
Some of these contributions appeared in proceedings of top-tier AI conferences, such as AAAI, AAMAS, and IJCAI, and presented at the venues.

Free Research Field

人工知能