2016 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Repeated game analysis on long-term partnerships
| Project/Area Number |
26780122
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
|
| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
|---|
| Research Field |
Economic theory
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Wakayama University |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
|
|---|
| Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha) |
KOBAYASHI Hajime 関西大学, 経済学部, 教授 (10347510)
SEKIGUCHI Tadashi 京都大学, 経済研究所, 教授 (20314461)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
|
| Keywords | 繰り返しゲーム / チーム生産 |
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We investigate cooperation in teams by theoretical analysis of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. In particular, we extend the model of repeated partnerships by Radner, Myerson and Maskin (1986, Review of economic Studies) allowing heterogeneous partners to choose and commit their sharing rule to achieve the most efficient equilibrium in the sense of maximizing the partners' total payoffs. We characterize the optimal sharing rule which supports the most efficient equilibrium payoff vector. We also consider the situation where it is not efficient for all members to work, and obtain the necessary and sufficient condition to achieve exact efficiency. Even when the condition fails, we obtain the approximate efficiency result.
|
| Free Research Field |
ゲーム理論
|
