The Effect of Campaign Promises in Political Competition:

2016 Fiscal Year Final Research Report

• Project/Area Number: 26780178
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Public finance/Public economy
• Research Institution: Waseda University
• Principal Investigator: Asako Yasushi 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 准教授 (70634757)
• Project Period (FY): 2014-04-01 – 2017-03-31
• Keywords: 公約 / 選挙 / 応用ゲーム理論

Outline of Final Research Achievements

This study develops a formal model in which a candidate strategically decides both a campaign platform and a policy to be implemented while most of past studies consider only one of them. Especially, this study supposes that a candidate who implements a policy that differs from his/her platform must pay a cost of betrayal. The model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had difficulty with. First, candidates with different characteristics have different probabilities of winning an election. Second, candidates who prefer an extreme policy won some elections. Moreover, this study also shows some difficulties to explain why candidates announce ambiguous platforms.

Free Research Field

政治経済学