2015 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Mechanism design by an informed monopolist
| Project/Area Number |
26885081
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Komazawa University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2014-08-29 – 2016-03-31
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| Keywords | メカニズムデザイン理論 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We study informed principal problems in a bilateral trade environment where
a seller and a buyer have private information about types affecting their cost and valuation. The informed seller has full bargaining power to design a trading mechanism. We prove the existence of the best separating equilibrium for the seller. The seller's interim payoff vector in the equilibrium is determined by that in a particular direct mechanism called the least-cost-separating mechanism. We provide a characterization of the mechanism which shows that each menu in the mechanism takes a simple format called the almost fixed price with entry compensation. We also investigate how the privacy of the seller's information affects allocative efficiency and distributional consequences.
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| Free Research Field |
オークション理論
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