2015 Fiscal Year Final Research Report
Comparative Political Economy of the Fluctuating Producer Cartels in Japan
| Project/Area Number |
26885089
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Politics
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| Research Institution | Musashino University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2014-08-29 – 2016-03-31
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| Keywords | レント / カルテル / 規制 / 政府と市場 / 政治制度 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Politics of regulation in Japan used to be regarded as the closely linked to special interests, especially like large corporations. This research project tries to provide an analysis of the fluctuation of these producer cartels in Japan from a comparative perspective.
By empirically identifying various special interest’ rents and collective action costs in each sector, we could have a couple of results below for further study. Firstly, electoral institutional reform induces the decline of producer rent, but not always the case. Secondly, collective action costs in each sector could be the potential factor for identifying the decline or the sustaining of the producer cartels. Thirdly, political mechanism for explaining those variations could be substantially identified by tracing the process of actual fluctuation of cartel, such as the case in agriculture sector. JA would be the one of the main actors for digging into this issue.
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| Free Research Field |
行政学
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