Applications of differential games to trade theory
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|Allocation Type||Single-year Grants|
|Research Institution||Kobe University|
SHIMOMURA Kazuo Kobe University, Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Professor, 経済経営研究所, 教授 (60116217)
|Project Period (FY)
1995 – 1997
Completed(Fiscal Year 1997)
|Budget Amount *help
¥700,000 (Direct Cost : ¥700,000)
Fiscal Year 1997 : ¥300,000 (Direct Cost : ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 1996 : ¥200,000 (Direct Cost : ¥200,000)
Fiscal Year 1995 : ¥200,000 (Direct Cost : ¥200,000)
|Keywords||differential game / optimal control theory / feedback-Nash equilibrium / homogeneity in differential equations and felicity functions / multiple state variables / linear Markov strategy / 国際貿易論 / 内生的経済成長論 / 最適制御理論 / 偏微分方程式論 / Feedback-Nash解 / 均衡解のパラメーターへの依存性 / homotheticity / 複数状態変数|
Let us atate the main theorem that was proved in the present project Consider a differential game as follows :
(1) The numbers of playrs, state variables and control variables of each playr, say M,N and J_i, i=1, ..., M,are arbitrarily fixed.
(2) Let x and c_i are an N-dimensional vector of state variables and an J_<ii>-dimensional vector of control variables of playr i. Let us assume that the motion of x is determined by the system of differential equations
x^^・=F (x, c),
where c= (c_1, ...c_M). Let us denote the objective functional of playr i by
V_i=*u_i (c_i) exp [-rt] dt
where the rate of time preference r is assumed to be positive and constant.
In this differential game, we can state that :
Assume that u_<ii> is homogeneous of degree alpha>0, that F is homogeneous of degree one in x and c, and that all playr i's opponents use Markov strategies that are homogeneous of degree one. Then
(ii) Playr i's best reply is homogeneous of degree one in x.
(ii) The maximized value function V_i is homogeneous of degree alpha in x.
The proof can be found in Long and Shimomura (Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, December 1997).
Research Output (9results)