Life and Time--from the point of view of Aristotle's biology--
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|Allocation Type||Single-year Grants|
|Research Institution||YAMAGATA UNIVERSITY|
SHINOZAWA Kazuhisa YAMAGATA UNIVERSITY,FACULTY OF LITERATURE & SOCIAL SCIENCES,ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, 人文学部, 助教授 (20211956)
|Project Period (FY)
1996 – 1998
Completed(Fiscal Year 1998)
|Budget Amount *help
¥2,000,000 (Direct Cost : ¥2,000,000)
Fiscal Year 1998 : ¥600,000 (Direct Cost : ¥600,000)
Fiscal Year 1997 : ¥700,000 (Direct Cost : ¥700,000)
Fiscal Year 1996 : ¥700,000 (Direct Cost : ¥700,000)
|Keywords||Aristotle / time / life / energeia / mind / soul / biology / 霊魂論 / 生物学 / 感覚|
The aim of this research is to reconstruct Aristotle's biological writings from the point of view of <time>, on the basis of my former investigations concerning <the time of Physica and the time of Poetica>. Energela and Dynamis have a function as a pair of modal or temporal concepts in Arlstotle's philosophy and have a fundametal role in his analysis of biological beings. To make this point clear, I try to reconsider Aristole's methodology of defining <psyche> in his De Anima.
Aristotle offers the following three definitions of Soul (psych e).
(1) form of a natural body that has a life potentially.
(2) the first actuality of a natural body that has a life potentially.
(3) the first actuality of a natural body that has organs.
These definitions are supposed to undergo step-by-step revision. But why does he adopt a circuitous procedure? According to my interpretation, its aim is to indicate that some preconceptions hinder us from approaching the accurate status of psyche. Among such deep-roo
ted preconceptions are an atomistic way of thinking and a confusion between matter (hyle) and composite things. They make us ignore the function of psyche as form (eidos) in a crucial way.
The definition(1) cannot be an end of the procedure. For Aristotle does not still succeed in making clear the precise connection or difference between a living natural body and a mere (not living natural) body. This leads him to reconsider the potentiality-actuality relation from a new point of view, namley a view that actuality does not indicate any concrete (individual) existence but rather eidos (form) in Aristotle's sense. The definition (2) and (3) begin from this point. What is important and controversial is that It Is an actually(energeia) and an organ that Aristotle Introduces as a clue to the last definition in the scope of De Anima. So the next task is to elucidate how these functions (actuality and organ) have a close relation to each other and, in other words, if actualtiy-potebtiality is a temporal concept, what kind of temporal aspect each organ must have. Without grasp this point In a precise way, we cannot understanding Aristotle's biology and ontology to the full. Less
Research Output (4results)