SHRESTHA Manoj l. Konan University, Faculty of Business Administration, Professor, 経営学部, 教授 (90248097)
KITAGAWA Katsuhiko Kansai University, Faculty of Economics, Professor, 経済学部, 教授 (50132329)
IIDA Tsuneo Chubu University, Graduate School of Information and Management, Professor, 大学院・経営情報学研究科, 教授 (70022449)
HIGASHIMOTO Haruo Kyoto Women's University, Faculty for the Study of Contemporary Society, Professor, 商学部, 教授 (80218693)
KAWAURA Akihiko Otaru University of Commerce, Department of Economics, Professor, 商学部, 教授 (10271610)
YODA Hiroshi Kyoto Women's University, Faculty for the Study of Contemporary Society, Professor, 大学院・法学府, 教授 (50093539)
YABUNO Yuzo Kyushu University, Graduate School of Law, Professor, 大学院・法学府, 教授 (10047730)
|Budget Amount *help
¥12,600,000 (Direct Cost : ¥12,600,000)
Fiscal Year 2000 : ¥5,100,000 (Direct Cost : ¥5,100,000)
Fiscal Year 1999 : ¥3,500,000 (Direct Cost : ¥3,500,000)
Fiscal Year 1998 : ¥4,000,000 (Direct Cost : ¥4,000,000)
The monetary crisis that erupted in Thailand in July 1997 spread rapidly to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea and adjacent areas. In the preceding decade or so, the so-called NIEs in East and Southeast Asia had shown remarkable economic development, which attracted a worldwide attention of scholars and policy makers. The World Economy and the Developing Countries (The World Bank, 1992), even projected that the greater Chinese economic area, including the NIEs, will, by 2002, supersede the United States in scale, achieving the largest economic area in the world.
It is well to remember here that the rapid economic development of Japan in the late 60s and 70s bade serious defiance to the then predominant "modernization" hypotheses. Nor could the "World Systems" hypotheses that meant to criticize the basic flaws of the modernization hypotheses attribute to Japan a proper place in these systems. Social scientists grappled with this phenomenon and proposed a number of "Japan model
s, " without much success though. But the rise of East and Southeast Asian economies questioned the worthiness of the search for Japan models itself. If Japan had been the only exception to the seemingly universal pattern, it should have been possible to construct an account by extracting common social, historical and other denominators. Now the task is to expand the horizon and cover a greater part of Asia.
Significant efforts were, of course, made. In fact, it would not be too much to say that the major focus of developmental studies in the last two decades of the twentieth century was placed on the trajectories of Asian economies. For example, the frequently used designation, the "Asian Tigers, " testifies to the assumption that there should be at least some common denominators that explain the sudden and strong development in the entire area. If not the inhabitation of the carnivorous feline animal itself, then one or more social causes, yet unidentified, became the object of the great hunt.
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation is composed of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and Maldives, the seven countries which are inhabited by the Panthera Tigris but which in terms of economic development have not achieved anything comparable to the Asian NIEs. We noted strongly that while studies on the success stories of a portion of Asia abounded, much too few researches had been conducted on the reasons why other portions of Asia had not trod on the heels of the NIEs. As Professor Iida has rightly pointed out there is a great divide somewhere between India and Myanmar.
Leaving the details of our study to the following chapters, I would dare say that it was the modernization processes themselves that devastated the SAARC tigers : not the failure of modernization, but the failure as a result of modernization. I do not mean by this that they should have been happier if they had not joined the great current of worldwide modernization, however one defines this extremely volatile term. There could have been no part of the world that could even hope to stay away from this historical trend. It is, however, equally obvious that the piteous filthiness and indigence had been caused by partially successful modernization.
We admit that our three-year study has not reached definite answers to the "failures by modernization" in the SAARC countries, but at the very least we have been able to identify some of the central factors which, together, constitute the basic axes for further discussions. We would like earnestly to invite the readers' comments and criticisms, which should certainly contribute to our future researches. Less