|Budget Amount *help
¥2,800,000 (Direct Cost : ¥2,800,000)
Fiscal Year 2000 : ¥700,000 (Direct Cost : ¥700,000)
Fiscal Year 1999 : ¥900,000 (Direct Cost : ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 1998 : ¥1,200,000 (Direct Cost : ¥1,200,000)
How can economic agents seeking their own private goals attain cooperation and develop their cooperative relationships in the long run? Our research considers these problems of social cooperation by employing game theoretical methodologies. In particular, our analysis is focused on situations where economic agents attempt to realize voluntary cooperation through negotiations, organization, and institutional arrangements. To analyze these problems on micro-levels of individual reasoning and decision-making, we apply new developments of game theory such as game equilibrium theory, evolution and learning theory, and game experiments. The main results are as follows.
(1) Dynamic game analysis of cooperation and developments
We present a dynamic game model, based on an n-person prisoners' dilemma with non-overlapping generations, which describes agents' strategic behavior, organization formation, and social developments. We consider how social developments can be promoted through the formation of organizations for cooperation.
(2) Bargaining games for group formation and payoff distributions : theory and experiments We develop non-cooperative bargaining game models for group formation and payoff distributions. We also conduct bargaining experiments in Japan and Austria to test our theoretical predictions. The main experimental evidence is that negative reciprocity (rejecting unfair offers) is critical to subjects' behavior as well as monetary payoffs maximization.
(3) Economic applications
We apply theoretical results to several empirical problems including the accumulation of social overhead capitals and global warming problems, and consider policy implications of the results.