| Project/Area Number |
12650530
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
交通工学・国土計画
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| Research Institution | KYOTO UNIVERSITY |
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Principal Investigator |
KOBAYASHI Kiyoshi Kyoto Univ., Dept. of Civil Eng., Professor, 工学研究科, 教授 (50115846)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
MATSUSHIMA Kakuya Kyoto Univ., Dept. of Civil Eng., Research Associate, 工学研究科, 助手 (60303848)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2000 – 2001
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2001)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,600,000)
Fiscal Year 2001: ¥2,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000)
Fiscal Year 2000: ¥1,500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000)
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| Keywords | reservation / uncertainty / self-selection / social benefit / rational expectation equilibrium |
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| Research Abstract |
In this research, we consider a single market of transportation services whose supply and consumption are simultaneously made at a point in time. The limited number of tickets is supplied by a monopolistic firm with the fixed price. A customer who is willing to consume a service is faced with two options at reserving timing : 1) to purchase a ticket now, or 2) to defer his/her decision by consuming timing. In choosing an option, the customer should take into account two different types of risks : 1) demand-side risks and 2) supply-side risks. Once the customer has purchased a ticket in advance, he/she is inevitably faced with demand-side risks that he/she should pay for fees if the reservation should be cancelled. The customer can avoid these types of risks by deferring decisions at reserving timing. However, by reserving decisions, the customers will be faced with supply-side risks that the services will be sold out at consuming timing. Thus, the customer is forced to resolve trade-offs between demand- and supply-side risks.
This research has formulated an individual reservation behavior model and a rational equilibrium model to forecast the number of reservation in the service market where service supply is rationed. The reservation system functions as a self-selection mechanism, through which those who have relatively large utility toward the service are automatically selected through individual reservation behavior. Eventually, the priorities in allocation are attached to those who have relatively large utility and the efficiency in allocation of the service can be improved. This research also analyzed economic benefit of reservation system. It shows that reservation system does not always improve social welfare because of cancellation fee.
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