| Project/Area Number |
12680434
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
社会システム工学
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| Research Institution | Tokyo Institute of Technology |
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Principal Investigator |
MUTO Shigeo Tokyo Institute of Technology, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology(Department of Value and Decision Science), Professor, 大学院・社会理工学研究科, 教授 (50126330)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2000 – 2003
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2003)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,500,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
Fiscal Year 2001: ¥900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 2000: ¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
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| Keywords | Social dilemma / Prisoner's dilemma / Game Theory / Stable set / Consistent set / Fuzzy game / Coalitional government / Dynamic model / パテントライセンシング / 交渉集合 / 寡占 / 複占 / 定常均衡 / 提携形成 / 交渉ゲーム / パレート最適性 / 個人合理性 |
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| Research Abstract |
This research studies social dilemma in socio-economic systems from the viewpoint of farsighted stable set and of fuzzy game theory concept. The following are main results.
1 Developing relations between stable sets (and consistent sets) and stationary equilibrium points in a bargaining game, I define a new and more appropriate solution concept to social dilemma situations. I verify its effectiveness applying it to several social dilemma cases.
2 I study dynamic coalition formation process by the use of stable sets and the Shapley value. In particular I pick up the Hosokawa anti-LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) cabinet formed in 1993. In the static analysis it was already shown that this cabinet was the only stable coalition. Our dynamic analysis newly reveals that in case the LDP has an initiative in negotiation then pro-LDP cabinet can be formed though the Hosokawa cabinet is formed when an anti-LDP has an initiative.
3 Analysis of dilemma situations from the viewpoint of fuzzy games gives us a new insight into the problem how to avoid social dilemmas.
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