|Budget Amount *help
¥3,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥1,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000)
Fiscal Year 2001: ¥1,700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000)
The main object of this research is to evaluate the economic efficiency of an institution in civil execution system, the Minimum Auction Price (MAP hereinafter), which has been one of the hot issues in the regulation reform debate in Japan today. The result from my research can be summarized as follows.
First, a comparative account tells us that the MAP is not absolute necessity derived logically from the principles of Japanese civil execution, such as the liquidation principle, or the residual value principle. Especially the experiences disputes and institutional outcomes in the foreclosure reform in the USA in late 90s gives us a hint for another possibility of real estate liquidation for the debt collection.
Second, applying a corporate finance theory to the real estate finance, we find that the MAP is only a second best solution to determine the control right over price setting of the collateral. The formal guideline for the efficient reserve price, formulated by the Auction Game theory, therefore, cannot be directly applied to the MAP.
Third, a statistical analysis, using the data sets of more than 1500 cases from judicial sales recently operated in the Tokyo and Osaka District Court reveals, that the competition pressure in the collateral auction is a key element to avoid the perverse effect of the MAP.