Research on Strategic Information Revelation in Organizations and Networks
| Project/Area Number |
13630004
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
経済理論
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| Research Institution | Hitotsubashi University |
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Principal Investigator |
YAMAZAKI Akira Hitotsubashi University, Graduate School of Economics, Professor, 大学院・経済学研究科, 教授 (70143716)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2001 – 2003
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2003)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,800,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥1,500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000)
Fiscal Year 2001: ¥1,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000)
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| Keywords | asymmetric information / Bayesian game / Bayesian strong equilibrium / incentive compatible core / interim core / cooperative game / monetary equilibrium / buying and selling price spread / 戦略的コーディネーションの安定性 / ラージ・エコノミーの一般均衡モデル / ラージ・エコノミー / 国際研究者交流 / 国際情報交換 |
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| Research Abstract |
The purpose of this research project was to analyze the effects of strategic behaviors at interim period of economic agents, who are asymmetrically endowed with information about their preference relations and initial endowments, on the performance of markets through price mechanism in the economy relying on the cooperative extensions of Bayesian game framework. During the course of our research works, we have obtained various results including the following :
1)The analytical framework of cooperative extensions of Bayesian game is constructed and the some of the preliminary results concerning the interim core and the strong equilibrium contracts are obtained. Much of this work is summarized in a forthcoming book to be published from an international publisher.
2)In a Bayesian pure exchange economy the Bayesian incentive-compatible coarse core is proved to be nonempty. On the other hand, the Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core may be empty, even for Bayesian pure exchange economies satisfying the traditional (neoclassical) assumptions. A sufficient condition for the latter's non-emptiness is established ; the condition specifies relationships among effects of different type profiles.
3)In the case of a large Bayesian economy the Bayesian incentive-compatible interim core is proved to be non-empty without imposing a stringent condition imposed in the case of finite economies in (2).
4)In our research effort of analyzing incentive efficient transfers of risky and safety assets among economic organizations and agents, as an initial basic result we first proved an existence a monetary equilibrium in a general equilibrium setting without transactions costs but with buying and selling price spreads.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(25 results)
