Open Simulation Framework for Deregulated Electric Power Market
| Project/Area Number |
13680575
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
エネルギー学一般
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| Research Institution | KYOTO UNIVERSITY |
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Principal Investigator |
TEZUKA Tetsuo Kyoto university, Graduate School of Energy Science, Professor, エネルギー科学研究科, 教授 (60163896)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2001 – 2002
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2002)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
Fiscal Year 2001: ¥2,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,300,000)
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| Keywords | Deregulation / Simulation Model / Behavior Analysis / Price Spike / Autonomous Decision-Making / エネルギー市場 / シミュレーション / 自由化 / 制度設計 / JAVA / ネットワーク環境 / 電力市場 / 企業利益 |
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| Research Abstract |
The deregulation trend in the electric power market since 1980's is partly due to the anticipation that introducing a pool market boosts the power companies' competitiveness and also lowers the electricity prices. Through California Electricity Crisis, however, it has been well understood that a pool market principle sometimes leads to the investment circumspection and the resultant price fluctuation. In general, power companies in the locally-monopolized market can easily invest in power-generation plants so as to meet the power demand, and the deregulation of the power industry inevitably makes the investment more risky. Furthermore, there have been invented no rules for making sufficient incentives in strategic investment. Stabilization of the power supply under the deregulated power market is an important requirement for the deregulated framework of the power market
This study aims to develop a simulation model of the deregulated power market and to design the appropriate market rul
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es that can stabilize the power prices. The investment behavior of power companies and the rules for the pool market deals are modeled to analyze the necessary conditions for stabilizing the power supply. The simulation results indicate that the large power company can make investment in the power plants with high power price. On the contrary, the small power company tends to invest for the power plant with low power price. It can be also implied that the pool market with the small-scaled power companies is more competitive than the market with the large-scaled power companies. In addition, it is shown that a pool market with small-scaled power companies is not accompanied by the stable capital investment and more rapidly face with the adverse situations from overinvestment or underinvestment than a power market composed by large-scaled companies. In conclusion, the competitive pool market can be realized under the deregulated framework, but some rules that control the companies' investment so as to stabilize the market behavior are unavoidably required Less
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Report
(3 results)
Research Products
(13 results)
