| Project/Area Number |
14201014
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
教育・社会系心理学
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| Research Institution | HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY |
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Principal Investigator |
YAMAGISHI Toshio Hokkaido Univ., Graduate School of Letters, Professor, 大学院・文学研究科, 教授 (80158089)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
YAMAGISHI Midori Hokkaido Univ., Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, Professor, 高等教育機能開発総合センター, 教授 (20211625)
TAKAHASHI Nobuyuki Hokkaido Univ., Graduate School of Letters, Associate Professor, 大学院・文学研究科, 助教授 (80333582)
YUKI Masaki Hokkaido Univ., Graduate School of Letters, Associate Professor, 大学院・文学研究科, 助教授 (50301859)
石井 敬子 北海道大学, 大学院・文学研究科, 助手 (10344532)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2002 – 2005
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2005)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥49,270,000 (Direct Cost: ¥37,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥11,370,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥12,740,000 (Direct Cost: ¥9,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥2,940,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥11,310,000 (Direct Cost: ¥8,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥2,610,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥10,530,000 (Direct Cost: ¥8,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥2,430,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥14,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥11,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥3,390,000)
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| Keywords | trust / cooperation / cross-national comparison / prisoner's dilemma / trust game / empathy / social intelligence / reputation / 囚人のジレンマゲーム / 社会的知性 |
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| Research Abstract |
The goal of this study was to clarify the mechanisms that promote voluntarily based social order, not constrained by the closed nature of social relations, in a situation in which provision is "assurance" of security based on commitment relations is not possible. We used "artificial societies" created in the laboratory to achieve this goal. As a means to achieve this goal, we found that building a trust relationship (i.e., transforming an opportunistic relationship into a trust relationship) requires risk taking. We further identified socio-relational and socio-institutional conditions that are required for this transformation. Specifically, our results indicate the followings. ◆Risk taking plays an indispensable role in building a trust relationship. ◆In building a trust relationship, a strategy to cooperate while reducing the risk of trusting to the minimal is highly effective. ◆The role that reputation plays in reducing the agency problem caused by information asymmetry varies depending on the nature of the society or market-whether it is open or closed. Negative reputation is effective in closed societies, and positive reputation is effective in closed societies. ◆Punishment of non-cooperators in a group is produced by a different psychological mechanism that produces punishment of out-group defectors. ◆Heuristics explain cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game better than utility transformation model. ◆Expectation of generalized exchange within a group is indispensable in cooperation toward in-group members, whether the groups are minimal groups or nationality groups. However, it is not a necessary condition for cooperation toward in-group members when interactions among group members exist. ◆Experience of collectivistic social institutions make collectivistic (or interdependent) self-construal and causal attribution (i.e., collectivistic belief system) salient.
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