Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
|Allocation Type||Single-year Grants|
|Research Institution||Teikyo University|
OURA Hirokuni Teikyo University, Faculty of Economics, assistant professor, 経済学部, 助教授 (60297116)
UMINO Michio Tohoku University, Graduate School ofArts and Letters, professor, 大学院・文学研究科, 教授 (90016676)
KANAI Masayuki Yamagata University, Faculty of Education, assistant professor, 教育学部, 助教授 (60333944)
FUJIYAMA Hideki Dokkyo University, Faculty of Economics, assistant professor, 経済学部, 助教授 (80327014)
SUDO Naoki Gakushuin University, Faculty of Law, professor, 法学部, 教授 (60262680)
SICHIJO Tatuhiro Osaka Prefecture University, School of Economics, assistant professor, 経済学部, 助教授 (40305660)
佐藤 嘉倫 東北大学, 大学院・文学研究科, 教授 (90196288)
鬼塚 尚子 帝京大学, 文学部, 講師 (50307203)
辻 竜平 東京大学, 大学院・人文社会系研究科, 助手 (40323563)
林 直保子 関西大学, 社会学部, 助教授 (00302654)
|Project Period (FY)
2002 – 2004
Completed(Fiscal Year 2004)
|Budget Amount *help
¥13,800,000 (Direct Cost : ¥13,800,000)
Fiscal Year 2004 : ¥3,500,000 (Direct Cost : ¥3,500,000)
Fiscal Year 2003 : ¥4,100,000 (Direct Cost : ¥4,100,000)
Fiscal Year 2002 : ¥6,200,000 (Direct Cost : ¥6,200,000)
|Keywords||order problem / social dilemma / free rider / evolutionary game theory / selective interaction / job change / 選択的移動 / 移動可能なジレンマ実験 / 転職調査 / 集団間の移動 / 離脱型応報戦略 / シミュレーション / 小集団実験 / 転職 / 選択的プレーパラダイム / 非ランダム相互作用モデル / 実験的研究|
In this research project, we extended the idea of selective interaction of Orbel & Dawes (1991), and examined whether cooperative action can gain higher profit than non-cooperative action by selective movement between groups.
First, we examined this by mathematical model and computer simulation. It showed that when the share of cooperative type is large enough, selective movement and cooperative strategy can gain higher profit than other strategies.
Next, we conducted social dilemma experiments in which subjects can change their group. The results of the experiments show that cooperative players tend to escape from non-cooperative players and non-cooperative players have a tendency that they do not move while there are some cooperators in their group but they begin to move when there are no cooperators. This result shows that cooperative players have more tendency for selective movement than non-cooperative players.
In order to compare the results of laboratory experiments with date of actual society, we carried out a social research about job change. In this result, correlation between cooperative tendency and job change action or a job change intention was observed. It is conformable with the experimental result
As for methodology, evolutionary game theory and multi-agent models are thought to be important for micro-macro analysis in sociology. But our methodological analysis showed that N person prisoner's dilemma game, which we mainly examined this time, was too narrow as formulization of social dilemma, so it is better to define a cooperation situation as large game classes including N person chicken game. Research of selective movement in such general cooperative situation of is a future subject.