Research on the Foundation of Interactive Decision Theory from Epistemic Logical Aspect.
| Project/Area Number |
14540145
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
General mathematics (including Probability theory/Statistical mathematics)
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| Research Institution | Ibaraki National College of Technology |
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Principal Investigator |
MATSUHISA Takashi Ibaraki National College of Technology, Department of Natural Sciences, Lecturer, 自然科学学科, 講師 (40219473)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2002 – 2004
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2004)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,000,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000)
Fiscal Year 2003: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000)
Fiscal Year 2002: ¥1,400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000)
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| Keywords | Epistemic logics / Information structure / Nash equilibrium / Core equivalence theorem / Economy under uncertainty / Rational expectations equilibrium / Communication / Protocol / 期待均衡 / コア同値定理 / 行動予測 / 戦略型ゲーム / 認識論理 / 合意定理 |
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| Research Abstract |
The purposes of this research is to investigate two points :
(i) The foundation of the epistemic process reaching consensus, and its application to Game Theory ;
(ii) The epistemic foundation of exchange economy under uncertainty with incomplete information, where traders have a multi-modal logic of awareness and belief.
We obtained the following results :
(1) We present the pre-play communication-process leading to a Nash equilibrium of a strategic form game. The stage sets up as follows : The players start with the same prior distribution on a finite state-space. In addition they have the private information given by the non-partition structure corresponding to the modal logic S4. Each player communicates privately his/her belief about the other players' actions through messages according to a communication-graph, and the receiver of the message updates her/his belief. When a player communicates with another, the other players are not informed about the contents of the message. In these
… More
circumstances we can show that
Theorem 1 : The players' predictions about the other players' actions regarding as the future beliefs converge in the long run, and those convergent beliefs constitute a Nash equilibrium of the game even when the communication-graph is not acyclic.
(2) We propose the multi-modal logic KT by which the traders use making their decision, secondly to establish the extended notion of rational expectations equilibrium for the economy, and finally to investigate the relationship between the ex-post core and the rational expectations equilibrium allocations with emphasis on modal logical point of view. The stage is set by the following : Suppose that the trader have the multi-agent modal logic KT : It is an extension of the propositional logic with many modal operators requiring only the axiom (T) "each traders does not know a sentence whenever it is not true." The logic have non-partitional information structures, each of which gives an interpretation of the logic. Each trader has own utility function which is measurable, but he/she is not assumed to know the function completely. It is shown that
Theorem 2 : In a pure exchange atomless economy under generalized information, assume that the traders have the multi-modal logic KT and they are risk averse. Then the ex-post core coincides with the set of all rational expectations equilibrium allocations for the economy.
(3) We present an extended notion of economy under uncertainty, called an economy with awareness structure, where each trader makes decision in his/her awareness and belief under incomplete information. We show the 'no trade theorem' under generalized expectations equilibrium in the extended economy :
Theorem 3: In a pure exchange economy under uncertainty, the traders are assumed to have an awareness structure and to have strictly monotone preferences. If the initial endowment is ex-ante Pareto optimal then there exists no other expectations equilibrium in awareness. Less
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(100 results)
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[Journal Article] Communication Leading to Nash Equilibrium without Acyclic Condition-S4-Knowledge Model Case-2004
Author(s)
T.Matsuhisa
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Journal Title
Computational Science-ICCS 2004 : 4th International Conference, Krako'w, Poland, June 6-9, 2004, Proceedings, Part IV, Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science(Marian Bubak, Geert Dick van Albada, Peter M.A.Sloot, et al.(Editiors)) 3039
Pages: 884-891
Description
「研究成果報告書概要(和文)」より
Related Report
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[Journal Article] No Speculation under Expectations in Awareness2004
Author(s)
K.Horie, T.Matsuhisa
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Journal Title
Computational Science - ICCS 2004 : 4th International Conference, Krako'w, Poland, June 6-9, 2004, Proceedings, Part IV, Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science(Marian Bubak, Geert Dick van Albada, Peter M.A.Sloot, et al. (Editors)) 3039
Pages: 915-922
Description
「研究成果報告書概要(和文)」より
Related Report
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[Journal Article] No Trade under Rational Expectations in Economy : A Multi-modal Logic Approach2004
Author(s)
T.Matsuhisa
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Journal Title
Computational Science and Its Applications - ICCSA 2004 : International Conference, Assist, Italy, May 14-17, 2004, Proceedings, Part III, S (Antonio Lagana, Marina L.Gavrilova, Vipin Kumar, et al.(Editors)) 3045
Pages: 915-925
Description
「研究成果報告書概要(和文)」より
Related Report
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[Journal Article] No Speculation under Expectations in Awareness2004
Author(s)
K.Horie, T.Matsuhisa
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Journal Title
Computational Science - ICCS 2004 : 4th International Conference, Krako'w, Poland, June 6-9, 2004, Proceedings Part IV Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science (M.BUBACK et al.(Editors))
Pages: 915-922
Description
「研究成果報告書概要(欧文)」より
Related Report
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[Journal Article] No Speculation under Expectations in Awareness2004
Author(s)
K.Horie, T.Matsuhisa
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Journal Title
Computational Science - ICCS 2004 : 4th International Conference, Krakow, Poland, June 6-9, 2004, Proceedings, Part IV (Marian Bubak, Geert Dick van Albada, Peter M.A.Sloot, et al. (Editors)) (Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science) 3039
Pages: 915-922
Related Report
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[Journal Article] No Trade under Rational Expectations in Economy : A Multi-modal Logic Approach2004
Author(s)
T.Matsuhisa
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Journal Title
Computational Science and Its Applications - ICCSA 2004 : International Conference, Assisi, Italy, May 14-17, 2004, Proceedings, Part III, (Antonio Lagana, Marina L.Gavrilova, Vipin Kumar, et al. (Editors)) (Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science) 3045
Pages: 915-925
Related Report
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[Journal Article] Robust models for Nash equilibrium2002
Author(s)
Takashi MATSUHISA
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Journal Title
Game Theory and Applications - Satellite Conference of ICM 2002, Proceedings, Qingdao (China)(L.PETROSJYAN, D.YEUNG (Editor))
Pages: 474-476
Description
「研究成果報告書概要(欧文)」より
Related Report
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