The Dysfunctional Effects of Monitoring on the Escalation of Commitment
| Project/Area Number |
15H06216
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Management
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| Research Institution | Tokyo University of Foreign Studies |
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Principal Investigator |
Watanabe Shu 東京外国語大学, 世界言語社会教育センター, 助教 (90754408)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2015-08-28 – 2017-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,860,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥660,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
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| Keywords | 経営学 / 経営戦略論 / 経営組織論 / 経営者 / 撤退 / 経営陣 / コミットメント・エスカレーション / 経営組織 / 経営戦略 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In this research project, my contributions are following. Firstly, I review existing literature of upper echelons perspective and discuss future research directions. Second, I analyze the relationship between resource dependence and executive co-optation and find that the more the firm depend not only on lenders but also on stock-holders, the less the firm has power. Thirdly, this research employs the escalation theory and demonstrates that increasing management accountability and monitoring by outside directors leads to the commitment escalation. Our argument is that the number of outside directors, which we usually assume increase the quality of corporate governance, has negative relationship with investment escalation.
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Report
(3 results)
Research Products
(7 results)
