A Theoretical Analysis of Default Rules in Modern Contract Law

Research Project

Project/Area Number	15H06546
Research Category	Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
Allocation Type	Single-year Grants
Research Field	Civil law
Research Institution	Nagoya University (2016) Kyoto Prefectural University (2015)
Principal Investigator	MATSUDA Takafumi 名古屋大学, 法学研究科, 准教授 (00761488)
Project Period (FY)	2015-08-28 – 2017-03-31
Project Status	Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
Budget Amount *help	¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000) Fiscal Year 2016: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000) Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Keywords	契約 / 任意法規 / 取引費用 / 情報の非対称性 / 行動経済学 / 民事法学 / 契約法 / デフォルト・ルール / 私的自治 / 契約正義 / 社会的厚生 / 典型契約論
Outline of Final Research Achievements	This research explores fundamental theoretical analysis of default rules in contract law. A key aspect of this research is functional analysis of default rules. Default rules have functions to reduce transaction costs, to solve the problem of asymmetric information and to help parties make rational decisions. From this point of view, default rules should fill gaps of contracts based on hypothetical bargains and lead party's decision making in some cases. This might sound ambivalent, but analysis of this research suggests that both are justified from a perspective, social welfare.