Theory and Empirical Analyses of Autocratic Elections
| Project/Area Number |
15H06682
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
|
| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
|---|
| Research Field |
Politics
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Tohoku University (2016)
Waseda University (2015) |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2015-08-28 – 2017-03-31
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,990,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥690,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | 権威主義体制 / 選挙 / 選挙制度 / 経済政策 / 民主化 / 多国間統計分析 / 中央アジア / 開発途上諸国 / 統計分析 / 選挙不正 / 政治制度 / 政治経済学 / 比較政治学 / 分配政治 / 政治紛争 |
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This project explored the causes and consequences of autocratic elections. In so doing, I offered a theory of autocratic elections and tested the theory on a battery of cross-national analyses and comparative case studies of the Central Asian Republics. Autocrats are able to manipulate election results in favor of themselves via electoral malpractice and electoral system change. Those measures facilitate overwhelming election victories but they also undermine various informational benefits that elections may bring. Under the constraint of this "electoral dilemma," autocrats design elections. Designed elections then have important implications on economic policy and post-electoral conflicts in the form of political business cycles, popular protests and leadership turnover. Part of the project has been published as book chapters or journal articles and also presented in multiple conferences and invited workshops.
|
Report
(3 results)
Research Products
(29 results)
