| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,380,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥780,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Using an asymmetric capital-tax competition model in which capital ownership can vary, I showed that there exists a unique degree of residential capital ownership such that the equilibrium outcome of the timing game switches from the Stackelberg to the simultaneous-move outcomes. I also developed a tax-competition model with two policy instruments: the tax rate and the tightness of tax enforcement (control of profit shifting). Comparing the equilibria of the noncooperative and cooperative enforcement choices, I pointed out two drivers that promote enforcement cooperation: complementarity (imperfect substitutability) of countries' enforcement efforts and tax leadership. I also explored the outcome of strategic delegation under transnational externalities. With sufficient complementarity of the public inputs, strategic delegation leads to the delegation to a greener politician. With sufficiently high substitutability, the only equilibria involve asymmetric provision of public inputs.
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