A Game-Theoretical Analysis of International Intervention in Civil Wars after the End of the Cold War
Project/Area Number |
16530103
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
International relations
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Research Institution | The University of Tokyo |
Principal Investigator |
ISHIDA Atsushi University of Tokyo, Department of Advanced Social and International Studies, Professor, 大学院総合文化研究科, 教授 (90285081)
|
Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
ISHIGURO Kaoru Kobe University, Department of Economics, Professor, 大学院経済学研究科, 教授 (20184509)
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Project Period (FY) |
2004 – 2006
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2006)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥3,400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,400,000)
Fiscal Year 2006: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥1,500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥1,400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000)
|
Keywords | civil war / international order / border λ' / game theory / 不干渉原則 / 武力不行使原則 |
Research Abstract |
The primary purpose of this research is to identify the political logic of reciprocal reconfiguration between domestic and international orders. We conceptualize that political order of a given society (whether it is a society of men or a society of states) hinges on the intersubjective understanding of legitimate membership of the society and the rightful action among its members. Therefore, political order changes when either the legitimate membership or the rightful action changes. On the one hand, the collapse of empires, as has been historically observed in the wake of the First World War, the second World War, and the Cold War, has been a product of the changing legitimate membership of the society of states. This process inevitably changed territorial boundaries of autonomous polities (i.e., sovereign states). And this territorial change often had some destabilizing impact on the local distribution of power between the would-be ruler and the would-be ruled within a newly independent state. On the other hand, the stability of a local political order would require the cancellation of this change in the local distribution of power between the ruler and the ruled. For this reason, the international community has often justified their intervention in individual states for the very purpose of politically offsetting this change by claiming that the problems at stake are indeed international. In this research, a political scientist (Atsushi Ishida) and an economist (Kaoru Ishiguro) cooperated across the intellectual border between their disciplines and have attempted to synthesize theories of the origins of civil wars with those of the causes and consequences of international intervention. Ishida's "The Political Logic of Reciprocal Reconfiguration between Domestic and International Orders : Constitutional Orders for Political Coexistence" and Ishiguro's "International Intervention to Political Reforms in Post-Conflict Societies" are two major results of our research.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(5 results)