| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,600,000)
Fiscal Year 2006: ¥600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥2,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000)
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| Research Abstract |
Professor Alan D.Woodland and I have generalized a decision making of attempted illegal migrants who illegally migrates into a host country, and that of a home firm who intentionally hires them who succeeded in crossing the border using an uncertainty theory, introducing a two-country, one good, two-factor (capital and labor) model of illegal immigration who faces border patrol and employer sanctions enforced by home country's government. We have analyzed whether or not there are equilibria, and how the immigration policies affect both countries in case there is capital mobility or nothing.
We show the existence of multiple-equilibria when the migrant is risk-averse against border patrol, and unique and stable equilibria when he is risk-neutral or loving. We also find that border patrol makes the host wage rise, while the effects of employer sanctions change in accordance to a level of the sanctions. In fact, Papademetriou D.G., B.Lindsay Lowell and D.A.Cobb-Clark (1991) obtained empirical results in which a probability of detection of would-be migrants at the border was 25-75 percent on average. Hence, we were motivated to examine how the immigration policies have influences on home wages. Our results have never been got by previous researches on illegal immigration except for the impacts on the home wages
We published our paper that involves our new outcomes from Journal of Development Economics (Elsevier, Netherlands) in December 2006.
Reference :
Papademetriou, D.G., B.Lindsay Lowell and D.A.Cobb-Clark, 1991, Employer sanctions : expectations and early outcomes, Chapter 8. In : M.Fix, Editor, The Paper Curtain : Employer Sanctions' Implementation, Impact, and Reform, The Urban Institute Press, Washington, D.C. (1991), pp.215-237.
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