| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
KIYONO Kazuharu Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Professor (00183038)
UEDA Atsuko Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Professor (00264581)
DAITOH Ichiroh Tohoku University, Graduate School of International Literature, Professor (30245625)
SUZUKI Kumi Yamagata Prefectural Yonezawa Women's Junior College, Faculty of Social Science and Information, Lecturer (80386523)
YU Yang Jyosai University, Department of Modern Politics, Lecturer (60386521)
于 洋 (干 洋) 早稲田大学, 現代政策学部, 専任講師 (60438794)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥12,760,000 (Direct Cost: ¥11,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥960,000)
Fiscal Year 2007: ¥4,160,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥960,000)
Fiscal Year 2006: ¥3,400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,400,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥5,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥5,200,000)
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| Research Abstract |
We wrote the final report in this year as the last year fix our project which consisted of ten chapters and some appendices. Each chapter was very useful and significant because it was written along with the title project and included some original ideas. The final report was organized as followings : Establishing a trade model of an international duopoly that consists of a state-owned firm in China and a private firm in a capitalistic country, this paper examines the world economic implications of the economic liberalization policy of China that releases a Chinese state-owned firm from the burden of output quota. It assumes, considering the new WTO, that while the capitalistic country does not adopt any trade policies, China promotes such a liberalization policy. It first analyzes the effects of China's economic liberalization on industry trade and then discusses its optimal level. The main findings are that China's liberalization policy also serves as a strategic trade policy, and th
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at perfect economic liberalization is not always best for China. Furthermore, we explore how creation of a semi-public joint venture by the multinational firm and the host-country's government affects the welfare of the host country and the profits earned by the multinational firm. As is suggested by the recently developed theory of mixed oligopoly, the semi-public joint venture firm takes account of the host-country's welfare when deciding on its output and has an incentive to produce more than the purely private firm. This commitment effect enhances the consumers' surplus and the profits earned by the joint-venture firm, benefiting both the host country and the multinational firm.
Introduction Prefatory Note(by ISHII, Yasunori)
Chapter 1 Features and Purposes of This Project(by ISHII, Yasunori)
Chapter 2 Perfect Economic Liberalization in China and Its Impacts(by ISHII, Yasunori)
Chapter 3 On Optimal Export Policies in an International Duopoly Consisting of a Labor-Managed Firm and a Capitalistic-Private Firm(by ISHII, Yasunori)
Chapter 4 International Oligopolistic Market and Strategic Trade Policies in a Developing Country-Unemployment in a Developing Country and Optimal Export Policies in a Developed Country-(by DAITOH, Ichiroh & ISHII, Yasunori)
Chapter 5 Strategic Regulation on Inward Direct Investment-Economic Effects of Creating a Semi-Public Joint Venture-(by KIYONO, Kazuharu)
Chapter 6 Financial Reform in China-A Study by the Evolutionary Game Theory-(by Suzuki, Kumi & ISHII, Yasunori)
Chapter 7 Financial Reform in China-A Study by the Experimental Economics-(Suzuki, Kumi, Satoh, Ayano & Matsuyae, Taisuke)
Chapter 8 Fiscal Reform and Changes in Social Security Finance(by U, Yo)
Chapter 9 Economic Growth of China : A Comparison with Japan and South Korea(by Atsuko, Ueda)
Chapter 10 Late-comer's Growth : Analysis of China's Mobile Handset Industry(by Kimura, Koichiro) Appendix Data Less
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