| Project/Area Number |
17H06590
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
|
| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
|---|
| Research Field |
Economic theory
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Tokyo Institute of Technology (2018)
The University of Tokyo (2017) |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2017-08-25 – 2019-03-31
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2018)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | 複数財オークション / 収入最大化 / 効率性 / オークション / 耐戦略性 / 統一価格オークション / 経済理論 / メカニズムデザイン / 公平性 / 対称性 |
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This project studies multi-object auctions that achieve desirable properties. Specifically, our goal is to find an auction that achieves the highest (expected) revenue, and an auction satisfying efficiency. When each bidder is restricted to get at most one object, we show that the minimum Walrasian equilibrium mechanism achieves the highest revenue among mechanisms satisfying certain incentive properties and weak fairness and efficiency conditions. We also analyze the incentive property of the uniform price auction which is known to be efficient as long as bidders report their true types. We show that when the number of objects is large enough compared with the number of bidders, bidders have no incentive to misreport their types.
|
| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
複数財のオークションは現実社会に多く存在する．特に近年は世界各国で政府が希少な資源をオークションを用いて企業や個人に配分している．その際に望ましい配分が達成されるかどうかは用いるオークション次第である．本研究は望ましい配分を実現するオークションの理論的解明を試みており，本研究結果は政府等が用いるべきオークションに示唆を与えるものである．その意味で社会的意義があると考えられる．
|
