Analysis of mitigation of asymmetric information in the long-term care market
Project/Area Number |
19330051
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
|
Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Applied economics
|
Research Institution | Okayama University |
Principal Investigator |
KISHIDA Kensaku Okayama University, 大学院・社会文化科学研究科, 准教授 (30346407)
|
Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
TANIGAKI Shizuko 岡山大学, 大学院・保健学研究科, 教授 (80263143)
FUJII Daiji 岡山大学, 大学院・社会文化科学研究科, 准教授 (50346409)
CHO Seigen 岡山大学, 大学院・社会文化科学研究科, 教授 (10304081)
乗越 千枝 鳥取大学, 医学部, 講師 (70389500)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2007 – 2009
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2009)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥13,780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥10,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥3,180,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥4,290,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥990,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥5,980,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,380,000)
Fiscal Year 2007: ¥3,510,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥810,000)
|
Keywords | 介護保険 / 情報の非対称性 / ケアマネジャー / 登録ヘルパー / 応用計量経済学 / 老年学 |
Research Abstract |
In the long-term care insurance, users are supposed to choose providers of long-term care. However, the information for choosing the providers is very limited. Hence, it has been said that users don't chose the providers by themselves, instead care managers recommend them the providers. However, the recommendation of care managers has been considered to be impartial due to pecuniary motivation. Hence, we studied how care managers recommend users the providers.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(1 results)