Project/Area Number |
20730198
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
|
Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Research Field |
Economic policy
|
Research Institution | 日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所 (2010) Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (2008-2009) |
Principal Investigator |
KONO Hisaki 日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所, 研究員 (40450548)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2008 – 2010
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2010)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥4,160,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥960,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥130,000 (Direct Cost: ¥100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥30,000)
Fiscal Year 2009: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2008: ¥2,730,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥630,000)
|
Keywords | 経済発展 / マイクロクレジット / 返済期限 / グループ貸付 / マイクロ保険 / 家計内意思決定 / 現在志向バイアス / マイクロファイナンス |
Research Abstract |
We show that because of the short maturity of microcredit, the introduction of microcredit can increase the borrowing amount from the moneylender, and the expansion of the maturity can substantially decrease the dependence on the moneylender. Our experimental evidence suggests that the group lending suffers from strategic default more than the individual lending, and the past behavior plays an important role in the group lending. Our experiment on microinsurance shows that providing opportunities to choose one of two insurance will achieve higher uptake rate than just selling one insurance policy, that the uncovered negative shock in the last period increases the uptake rate in the current period, and that framing on income distribution dos not affect the uptake decision. We also show that in the intrahousehold resource allocation, the household fails in implementing an effective commitment mechanism against the present bias problem, and time consistent wives whose husbands are present-biased are more likely to join ROSCA, a commitment mechanism outside the household, to protect the household resources.
|