| Project/Area Number |
22530251
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | Kwansei Gakuin University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
OHKAWA Takao 立命館大学, 経済学部, 教授 (10258494)
OKAMURA Makoto 広島大学, 大学院・社会科学研究科, 教授 (30177084)
HARIMAYA Kozo 立命館大学, 経営学部, 教授 (90347732)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2010 – 2012
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2012)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,290,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥990,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2010: ¥2,340,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥540,000)
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| Keywords | 有限責任 / 無限責任 / 権限委譲 / 企業統治 / 企業の行動目的 / 寡占市場 / Cournot寡占 / 権限移譲 / 寡占競争 / 企業金融 / Cournot複占 / 経済厚生 / 企業目的選択の内生化 |
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| Research Abstract |
We examine an effect of limited liability on strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly with demand uncertainty. We establish that owners of each firm always delegate their tasks, decisions, and responsibility to a manager under limited liability, while they do not always do so underunlimited liability. In addition, we construct a two-stage game in that the first stage, each of the oligopolistic firms chooses its business organizational form, while in the second stage each behaves in a Cournot fashion. We established that (1) even if an unlimited liability firm is viable, all firms become limited liability entities in equilibrium, and (2) the equilibrium industry configuration, where all firmsbecome limited liability entities, achieves efficiency in the second-best sense.
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