| Project/Area Number |
23530230
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Hosei University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha) |
HÜSSEINOV Farhad ビルケント大学, 経済学部, 教授 (50599488)
MIYAZAKI Kenji 法政大学, 経済学部, 教授 (10308009)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2013
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥5,070,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,170,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥2,340,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥540,000)
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| Keywords | ファジイ提携 / ファジイ・コア配分 / 競争均衡配分 / 支持価格 / 交換経済 / 非同質的分割可能財 / 精緻ゲーム / ファジィ提携 / ファジィ・コア配分 / 協力ゲーム / コア配分 / 市場メカニズム |
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| Research Abstract |
In traditional market games, coalitional payoffs are allocated to each player contingent upon the agreement that players contribute every initial endowment to the coalitions they are participating. On the contrary, in fuzzy market games, players do not necessarily have to contribute every initial endowment to the coalitions and they are free to decide their degree of commitment by contributing partially their initial endowment to the coalitions. It is well known in the literature that in economies with homogeneous divisible commodities fuzzy core allocations coincide with competitive equilibrium allocations. Without fuzzy coalitions, in general there is a core allocation that cannot be realized through the market mechanism. Nevertheless, in this research, I demonstrated that fuzzy core allocations can be attained by the market mechanism.
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