Theory and applications of incentives in dynamic contests
| Project/Area Number |
23730190
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Hiroshima University |
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Principal Investigator |
OGAWA Ryo 広島大学, 大学院・社会科学研究科, 特任准教授 (50533204)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2012
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2012)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,210,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥510,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / ミクロ経済学 / オークション |
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| Research Abstract |
We analyzed incentives in long-term contests between various agents in a framework of game theory and auctions. We formalized the problem from the viewpoint of contestants and analyzed the optimal design of effort-maximizing contests.
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Report
(3 results)
Research Products
(15 results)
